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COMMENTARY ON GENERAL RELIEF UNDER THE
EXCESS PROFITS TAX ACT OF 1950*

Thomas N. Tarleaut
I. General Statement

A NALYSIS of an excess profits tax involves inquiries which are
.L""l.. essentially foreign to the concepts of ordinary income taxation.
The question of excess profits arises only after taxable income has been
defined and characterized, its recipients determined and the time of
receipt established. The problem is to divide taxable income into two
components, one representing the corporation's normal profits, which
it is permitted to enjoy free of the penalty tax, and the balance which
is deemed to be "profits due to the outbreak of hostilities and to large
military expenditures."1 Under the Excess Profits Tax Act of 1950,2
as was the case under its World War II predecessor,3 the division is
accomplished by the determination of a "credit"4 which stands for the
"normal" component of the taxpayer's income. The taxpayer is given
an election between two basic alternative methods of computing the
credit. 11 One method permits the corporation to earn a stated minimum
return on invested capital without becoming subject to the excess profits
rates. 6 The second method, the one with which· we are concerned
here, is based on the taxpayer's average earnings for a ''base period,"
1946 through 1949.
The credit based on income is necessary to provide a fair measure
of normal earnings for corporations whose ratio of profit to investment
"' Paper delivered at the Institute on the Taxation of Business Enterprise, sponsored by
the University of Michigan Law School, June 25-28, 1951.-Ed.
t Member, New York Bar.-Ed.
1 S. Rep. No. 2679, 81st Cong., 2d sess. (hereinafter referred to as "Senate Report"),
part m, §1.
2 P.L. No. 909, 81st Cong., 2d sess. (January 3, 1951).
s I.R.C., §710 et seq.
4 Senate Report, part ID, §§4 and 5.
ISJbid.
6 Id. at §5.
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is more favorable than that enjoyed by industry generally, 'so that a
continuation of such earnings in the excess profits tax years could not
be considered the consequence of mobilization or war. The necessity
for the general relief provisions arises when it is recognized that for
some of those corporations base period average earnings do not reflect
normal performance-the corporation may not have done business
through the full span of the base period, it may have suffered abnormal
physical or economic adversities, or it may have grown or changed the
nature of its business to an extent which makes base period income
unrepresentative of normal earnings for the changed entity. The general relief provisions are in the law to correct the effect on the earnings
credit of such aberrations. They will be of practical interest to a large
number of corporate taxpayers, especially because of the dynamic
nature of economic conditions in the postwar years which make up the
base period. For the technician, they possess an irresistible fascination
because they are a testing ground of the underlying philosophy of the
whole excess profits concept, a legislative crystallization of economic
ideas which are unusually elusive and abstract. In the World War II
law, Congress sought to solve the same problems in a fundamentally
different way from that which it has recently chosen; the change invites
curiosity and study; whether it merits admiration is a question to which
it is hoped some of the answers may be suggested by this paper.
II. The Credit Based on Income
Before considering the relief provisions themselves, it will be necessary to summarize the features of the excess profits credit based on
average earnings, the correction of which is the object of the relief
sections.
In_ general, the credit is composed of the following amounts:
(1) 83-85 per cent of the average base period net income;7 (2) 12 per
cent of certain capital additions made during the last two years of the
base period;8 (3) 12 per cent of the net increase or reduction in capital
since the base period.9 The base period is the four years from January
1, 1946 to December 31, 1949, with variations to account for fiscal
year taxpayers. 10
7 The percentage is 85% for 1950, 84% for 1951, and 83% for 1952 and later years.
See section 602 of the Revenue Act of 1951, amending I.R.C., §435(a).
s I.R.C., §435(a)(l)(B).
9 I.R.C., §435(a)(l)(C).
10 I.R.C., §435(a)(l)(b). In this paper it will be assumed that a calendar year
taxpayer is discussed in each case.
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The starting point for the determination of average base period
net income, the chief component of the credit, is the corporation's
normal tax net income for each of the base period years.11 This amount
is adjusted, particularly to eliminate the effect of nonrecurrent items of
income,12 and the result is the excess profits net income for each such
year. For purposes of the formula, no base period year is deemed to
have shown a deficit; where there was an actual deficit, excess profits
net income is considered to have been zero.13 The poorest base period
year is then eliminated;14 the excess profits net incomes of the remaining three years are added together, the sum is divided by three,1 5 and
the result is average base period net income, 83-85 per cent of which is
the first component of the credit.
The general relief provisions are primarily concerned with the reconstruction of average base period net income, where base period
experience was affected by one of six abnormalities recognized by the
statute. In appropriate circumstances, the treatment of capital additions in the computation of the credit is also affected in order to avoid
duplicate allowances.
It should be noted that the elimination of the poorest base period
year provides a substantial measure of tax reduction without reference
to the relief provisions and it is expected that a large number of claims
which would otherwise be made will be automatically satisfied by this
element of the formula. 16 Where an abnormality affected not more
than a year of base period income, the corporation concerned would
ordinarily not need to consider the relief provisions if the remaining
36 months of the base period showed enough income to justify election
of the credit based on income in the first place. Similarly, the treatment
of deficit years as having produced a zero result for purposes of the
general average can be expected partially to alleviate the depressing
effects on the earnings average of other base period abnormalities. 17

III. General Relief: Introduction
In the broadest sense, any provision of the statute which reduces
the tax is a relief provision. We are concerned with the so-called "general relief provisions," designed to correct an excess profits credit which,
11 I.R.C.,
12 I.R.C.,
13 I.R.C.,
14 I.R.C.,

§433(a).
§433(b).
§435(d)(l).
§435(d)(2).
11, I.R.C., §§435(d)(3) and 435(d)(4).
16 Senate Report, part III, §9.
17 Ibid.
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because of certain specified circumstances has been determined to be
unrepresentative of the normal performance of the corporation. The
law also contains numerous special relief provisions which, for various
reasons, give tax benefits to corporations engaged in particular businesses.
In explaining the narrower scope of the general relief provisions in
the present law, as compared to those which were incorporated in the
World War II law,1 8 Congress cited19 the following examples of tax
reducing provisions which were thought to cut down very substantially
the need for special treatment of the hardship cases covered by the
general and special relief sections proper:
(1) The former excess profits law grant~d a $10,000 specific
exemption from taxable income. The present law gives a $25,000
minimum credit, which relieves many small corporations from liability for the new tax. 20
(2) In computing the credit based on income, taxpayers may
eliminate the worst year of their base periods in computing average
base period net income.21
(3) Deficit years which go into the computation of average
base period net income are treated as having produced no income
or loss. 22
( 4) Under the World War II law, unused excess profits
credits could be carried forward two years and carried back two
years. The present law provides for a one year carry-back and a
five year carry-forward.23
(5) The recent loss adjustment permits certain taxpayers
using the credit based on investment the privilege of including in
invested capital deficits incurred during the base period, or the
1940-1949 period, which were not used to offset income of other
years. 24
(6) The adjustment of average base period net income for
certain capital additions which took place during the last two
years of the base period.25
(7) The adjustment of average base period net income for
net capital additions after the end of the base period. 26
1s I.R.C., §722.
Report, part III, §9.
§431.
§435(d)(2).

19 Senate
20 lR.C.,
21 I.R.C.,
22 Ibid.
23 I.R.C.,

§432.
§437(£).
25 I.R.C., §435(a)(l)(B).
26 I.R.C., §435(a)(l)(C).

24 I.R.C.,
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(8) The ceiling limitation on combined normal and surtaxes
and excess profits taxes. 27
One special relief provision which is expected to have wide application is the alternative method of computing the excess profits credit
of regulated public utilities.28 These corporations are allowed a minimum credit which consists of 6 or 7 per cent ~f the total of invested
capital,29 retained earnings, and borrowed capital, plus normal and surtaxes payable for the year whose credit is being determined, less the
interest deduction for the year on borrowed capital. In general, the
formula applies to railroads, electric companies, airlines, municipal
transit corporations, and other public utilities whose rates are controlled
by government commissions. The minimum credit is substantially
equated with the rate of return allowed by such commissions. It was
believed in enacting this provision, that it was undesirable to consider
as excess profits for tax purposes, income which is normally limited to a
fair rate of return by regulatory authorities.3 ° Furthermore, it was noted
by the committees that these industries tended to lag behind business in
general in being able to take advantage of the widespread prosperity
which characterized the base period, because rate increases came more
slowly than increases in the cost of operation.31
Other special relief provisions give advantages to corporations engaged in the extraction of minerals of strategic importance, and make
adjustments on equitable grounds in the tax liability of particular
businesses.32
27 Before amendment by the Revenue Act of 1951, the ceiling limitation on combined
normal surtaxes and excess profits taxes was 62% of a corporation's income. Section 121 of
the Revenue Act of 1951 amended I.R.C., §430 to provide a new method for computing
the ceiling tax based upon a percentage of excess profits net income. The percentage is
17¼% for 1951 and 18% for subsequent years. Section 501 of the Revenue Act of 1951
amends I.R.C., §430, to provide a lower ceiling tax applicable to the first five years of
existence of corporations which began business after July 1, 1945.
2s I.R.C., §448.
29 Telephone, telegraph and air transport companies use 7% of capital; electric energy,
water, sewer, surface transportation companies, etc., use 6%. I.R.C., §448(c).
30 Senate Report, Part IV, §1.
3 1 Ibid.
32 I.R.C., §449 (personal service corporations); I.R.C., §436(b) (corporations deriving
most of their income from United States possessions); I.R.C., §453 (corporations deriving
income from certain mining and timber operations and from natural gas properties); I.R.C.,
§433(a)(l)(P) (corporations receiving amounts from the United States for the encouraging of exploration, development or mining of strategic and critical minerals and metals);
I.R.C., §450 (mining of strategic minerals); I.R.C., §457 (corporations completing contracts
under Merchant Marine Act); See also I.R.C., §451 (capitalization of advertising and good
will promotion expenditures).
Certain other special relief provisions were added by the Revenue Act of 1951: I.R.C.,
§459(a) (conversion to peacetime production-growth formula available to certain addi-
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The general relief provisions are designed to correct the excess
profits tax credit of the following classes of corporations:
(I) Corporations which suffered abnormal physical or economic adversities which substantially distorted their income during the base period. 83
(2) Corporations which changed products or services during
the base period making the resulting average earnings experience
unrepresentative of normal income.84
(3) Corporations which substantially increased their capacity
for production or operation during the base period. 311
( 4) Corporations which began business after the beginning
of the base period (new corporations).86
(5) Members of certain industries which were generally depressed during the base period.37
(6) Corporations which grew during the base period at a
substantially greater rate than industry in general. 38
The dominant motif of the general relief provisions of the new law
is the effort which has been made to make their operation automatic as

to both qualification for relief and the measure of correction afforded.
The chosen technique is a radical shift from the policy which governed
relief under the World War II law39 and much of the interest which
has been focused upon the new relief sections is concerned with the
consequences of the change.40
Under section 722 of the former law,. corporations qualified for
relief by showing that because of one or more recognized abnormalities,
their base period experience was "an inadequate standard of normal
earnings" and that as a consequence of the distortion, the resulting tax
was excessive and discriminatory. The relief credit was computed
tional manufacturing corporations); I.R.C., §459(b) (base period disaster-substitution of
income experience in computing average base period net income where catastrophe in base
period resulted in loss of productive facilities); I.R.C., §459(d) (television broadcasting
companies-alternative methods for computing average base period net income); I.R.C.,
§459(c) (consolidation of newspaper operations-excess profits credit may include an
amount equal to saving and operating expenses resulting from consolidation).
33 I.R.C.,
34 I.R.C.,
35 I.R.C.,
36 I.R.C.,
37 I.R.C.,
38 I.R.C.,
39 See H.

§442.
§443.
§444.
§445.
§446.
§435(e).
Rep. No. 3142, 81st Cong., 2d sess., part III, §9(c); Miller, "Another Year
of Section 722," 2 TAX L. REv. 417 (1947); Tarleau, "Section 722: Safety Valve of the
Excess Profits Tax," IO LAw & CoNTEM. PROB. 43 (1943).
40 See Alexander, "General Relief Provisions of the Excess Profits Tax Act of 1950,"
60 YALB L.J. 395 (1951).
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according to a hypothetical reconstruction of the corporation's base
period profits record as it would have been but for the specified abnormality. Each claim for relief was a separate problem in finance, accounting, and economics. The volume of relevant data affecting each
determination tended, because of the nature of the inquiry, to be
enormous. However, the fundamental objective of the statutory provisions was relatively clear and simple: an informed business judgment
of the effect of the recognized abnormality upon the taxpayer's base
period income. For the moment it is sufficient to say that the experience in administration of section 722 led Congress to abandon it for
the new method. The general statements describing abnormalities
which characterized the old law have been reduced to a great extent
in the new general relief provisions to numerical rules. 41 For example,
where under the old law it was necessary to show that increase in the
taxpayer's capacity for operation or production during the base period
made the income of that period an inadequate standard upon which to
base the tax, 42 under section 444 of the present law, qualification is
achieved by demonstrating that the increase itself was of a specified
size.
Furthermore, not every kind of hardship case for which relief was
available under section 722 is covered by the new law. The essential
difference between the old law and the new in the matter of qualification is not, however, in the number of recognized abnormalities but
in the technique of qualification. Under section 722 each claimant
actually had to show hardship resulting from a recognized abnormality
in order to qualify; under the new law Congress has generally determined that relief is justified whenever certain happenings have had a
designated quantitative effect on one or more aspects of the taxpayer's
economy in the base period. Rigid formulas have taken the place of
the somewhat elastic statements of principle which governed qualification under section 722. The substitution is much more than a technic;al alteration in the interest of speed and efficiency: it goes to the underlying philosophy of the relief provisions. By their very nature, the
hardship cases do not fit a pattern. This was recognized in section 722
which, as a "safety valve," was intended to invoke informed business
judgments to achieve fair and reasonable tax results adapted to the
facts of each case. The narrow formulations of the present law inevitably will bar relief in some deserving cases and give benefits which
41
42

Senate Report, part III, §9.

I.R.C., §722(b)(4).
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are not justified in others. Whether such results are justified by the
advantage of automatic operation remains to be seen.
The philosophy of section 722 has been even more emphatically
rejected in the present law in connection with the measure of relief.
Under the former law, the taxpayer's abnormal base period experience
was reconstructed with the purpose of determining an excess profits
tax credit which represented a fair measure of normal earnings for the
particular taxpayer. The corporation qualified under the present general relief provisions uses in computation of its credit an average base
period net income based upon the performance of its industry during
the base period. Relief is measured by multiplying the taxpayer's assets
by an "industry rate of return" determined according to formula. The
object is no longer a credit based upon what is normal for the taxpayer,
but one supposedly based upon what is normal for an industry. 43

IV. Industry Rates of Return

A. General: Industry Classification. With industry rates of return
as the key to the operation of the relief formulas, we may begin our
detailed consideration of the general relief provisions with section 44 7,
which tells us what an "industry" is and how the crucial "industry
rates of return" are computed.44
Section 447(c) sets forth 64 major industry groups, into one of
which every business corporation is to be placed. The system of classification is founded upon the specifications shown in the Standard
Industrial Classification Manual prepared by the Division of Statistical
Standards, Bureau of the Budget, for use by federal agencies, heretofore principally in connection with statistical compilations. The 64
categories are a consolidation of 397 industrial groups which in turn
embrace more than 1,000 industries which the Manual classifies.
The Secretary of the Treasury is directed to determine and proclaim
rates of return for each of the 64 major groups. 415 These are computed
48 Corporations which were reorganized during or after the base period present special
problems in connection with allowance and the computation of the excess profits credit
based on income. These are dealt with in Part II of the excess profits tax law, I.R.C.,
§§461-465. Part II also covers the application of the general relief provisions to corporations which have been parties to transactions therein described such as tax-free exchanges
covered by section 112 of the code, and include corporate "split-ups" and the acquisition
of the property of partnerships. Part II problems have not been treated in this paper but
their existence and the special rules provided for their solution should be noted in connection with cases involving reorg?,nizations.
« I.R.C., §447 also deals with the procedure in relief cases, as to which, see below,
pp. 403-405.
415 I.R.C., §447(a).
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by dividing the sum of the aggregate net incomes46 and the aggregate
interest deductions shown on the income tax returns £led by members
of the group during the base period, by the aggregate total assets of
such corporations at the close of the years for which such returns were
filed. Assets are based upon the balance sheets which the corporations
filed with their returns. For each group, by the method stated, a base
period yearly rate of return is computed for each year of the base
period, and a base period rate of return is computed by averaging the
yearly rates. 47
The relatively small number of major groups under section 447,
when compared with the immense variety of American industrial enterprise, provides grounds for a principal objection to the scheme of relief
under the new law. Even assuming the wisdom of a policy which
equates relief with the average tax position of members of the relieved
taxpayer's industry, relief based on section 447 is not consistent with
that policy because the crudeness of classification may make relief
depend upon the performance of industries that are economically
different.
·
In this connection it is interesting to consider the concept of "an
industry" as it was developed by the Bureau of Internal Revenue under
section 722. Under section 722 (b)(3) claims for relief depended, for
one thing, upon a showing by the taxpayer that "the circumstances
claimed as depressing its business also prevailed generally in the industry of which the taxpayer was a member."48 The Bureau's bulletin on
section 722 stated, "In most general terms an 'industry' comprises a group
of business concerns sufficiently homogeneous in nature of production or
operation, type of product or service furnished, and type of customers,
so as to be subject to roughly the same external economic circumstances
affecting their prices, volume and profits. Stated otherwise, an industry
will generally consist of all of the producers which compete with each
other in selling essentially the same products or services in the same
market. General economic conditions external to the industry itself will
be expected to affect the different competitors similarly if they are
selling the same products in the same market, and it is the similarity of
external conditions in the marketing processes which forms the basis of
the concept of an industry for purposes of determining when an indusComputed without regard for net operating loss deductions provided in section 23(s).
I.R.C., §447(b).
48 Bureau of Internal Revenue, BuLLBnN ON SECTION 722 OF THE lNrERNAL REVENUE CoDE (hereinafter called the "Bulletin") part I, i[(F).
46
47
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try is depressed." 49 It would seem that substantially similar criteria
should be applicable for the purpose of determining the average rates
of return under section 447 for the industry of which the taxpayer is a
member. But, for instance, under section 44 7 a single classification is
provided for "wholesale trade."50 Is there the slightest justification for
assuming that wholesale distributors of ladies dresses, nuts and bolts,
groceries, and antiques were subject to common market conditions during the base period, that they competed with one another, or that they
sold substantially the same products in the same markets? The answer
is clearly "No." Numerous other industry groups set forth in section
447(c) reveal equivalent possibilities of variety, e.g., personal services;
miscellaneous business services; miscellaneous retail stores; miscellaneous manufacturing industries; etc. Many of the 64 major groups are so
broad as to comprehend a wide range of products some of which may
have only a tenuous economic relation to others included in the industry group. The achievement of even a minimum of realistic results
would appear to have required a refinement of the industry classifications which would have substantially enlarged the number of categories so as to decrease the variety within each of them.
B. Industry Classification by Gross Receipts. Section 447 tells the
Secretary of the Treasury, rather than the taxpayer, what to do. The
relief sections themselves govern the application of the rates determined
under section 44 7 to the computation of the applicant corporation's reconstructed average base period net income. Given the rates by section
447, each corporation must establish its proper classification in one of
the industry groups in order to determine the earnings index which it
is to use.
With certain variations, industry classification is based upon a gross
receipts test in each case. Under sections 442, 443, 444 and 445, the
taxpayer's industry classification is the one of the 64 groups set forth
in section 447(c) to which is attributable the largest amount of the taxpayer's "gross receipts" for a stated period.51 Gross receipts are defined
for this purpose in section 435(e)(5), as
(A) the total amount received or accrued during the period
from the disposition of inventoried property, stock in trade, or
property held primarily for sale to customers in the ordinary course
of the taxpayer's business; plus
49 Ibid.
50 I.R.C., §447(c).
51 The provision for

depressed industry subgroups, I.R.C., §446, follows the pattern of
the sections enumerated, with certain variations discussed in connection with the general
treatment of §446.
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(B) the gross income attributable to the taxpayer's business,
excluding the following:
(1) Gross income from the disposition of property of all kinds;
(2) Gross income from the discharge of indebtedness;
(3) Dividends; and
( 4) Income attributable to the recovery of bad debts.
For most corporations, gross receipts for this purpose will correspond
roughly with gross receipts from the business regularly carried on.
Characterization based on gross receipts is one major cause of the
undesirable gulf between the cause and consequences of relief under
the present law. Some aspects of the problem are best illustrated in
connection with the operation of the specific relief provisions themselves and will be discussed later. But one major infirmity of the new
scheme lies in the lack of correlation between gross receipts and profits.
In the case of corporations which produce more than one product, that
disparity may produce absurd results if the product to which is attributable the larger share of gross receipts accounts for the smaller portion of
profit. Since average base period net income is being reconstructed, it
would have been logical to base industry classification on the principal
source of the taxpayer's net income. To have done so would have
caused no particular difficulty to single product corporations, and it
would have cured to some extent the "grab-bag" operation of the present
method as it applies to numerous multiple product businesses. The
problem of attributing portions of the net income of a corporation to
particular sources is admittedly not free of difficulty, but it is one which
is posed elsewhere in the code and in the relief provisions themselves. 52
The gross receipts test is-therefore justified by neither reason nor practical necessity.
C. The Base to Which the Industry Rates Are Applied. The industry rate of return, determined under section 44 7 and the test of
gross receipts, is, under sections 442, 443, 444 and 445, applied to the
taxpayer's "total assets" as of a moment established by the particular relief formula under which average base period net income is being substituted. Total assets for this purpose are defined in section 442(f) as
an amount equal to the sum of cash and the property held by the taxpayer in good faith for the purposes of the business. 53 Property is to be
52 See

pp. 386-388 below.
is excluded from the "total assets" base certain loans to related corporations
described in §435(£)(4), securities which are wholly or partially tax exempt under
5S There
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included in an amount equal to its adjusted basis for determining gain
upon sale or exchange.54
There are obvious disparities between the asset bases used by particular corporations when applying the industry rates of return, and the
industry-wide bases used in computing the rates. The taxpayer, in
making his claim, must exclude inadmissible assets, principally the stock
of other corporations, from the asset base, but these are included in the
industry base, as well as loans to members of controlled groups and
property not held in good faith for the purposes of the business. To
have required the Commissioner of Internal Revenue to analyze thousands of past income tax return balance sheets to exclude these items
would undoubtedly have been impractical, but the failure to do so
clearly tends to depress the industry rates of return below what they
would have been. had the asset base been computed as the taxpayer's
total assets are figured. 55 Perhaps some arbitrary general upward adjustment in the industry rates would have provided an equitable and
practical solution of this deficiency.

V. Commencing Business
The moment when a corporation "commenced business" is of critical importance .to the application of several of the general relief provisions because notwithstanding that it suffered one or all of the qualifying abnormalities heretofore noted, a corporation which commenced
business after the beginning of its base period is treated as a "new corporation" and is afforded only the relief given by section 445 for such
corporations.
The code does not define the term "commenced business." The
regulations state that it has a meaning different from "in existence," but
they do not require actual operations: 1'If the activities of the corporation have advanced to the extent necessary to establish the nature of
its business operations, it will be deemed to have commenced business. "56 For example, the regulation establishes that the acquisition
§22(b)(4), and stock in corporations which constitute capital assets in the hands of the
taxpayer other than stock in foreign personal holding companies.
Under §510 of the Revenue Act of 1951, amending I.R.C., §442(f), in computing
total assets, a reduction is required equivalent in amount to the indebtedness (other than
indebtedness includible in borrowed capital) owed by one member to another of a controlled group of corporations. The amendment was made to prevent duplication in computing the credits of the corporation involved.
Such basis is computed under the special rules provided in §441. I.R.C., §442(f).
I.R.C., §442(f).
56 U. S. Treas. Reg. 130, §40.445-l(a)(2).
54

55 Cf.
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of operating assets necessary to the kind of business to be carried on may
be a commencement of business, whereas mere organizational activity
is not. In the ordinary case, the regulations tell us, a corporation commences business when it begins "the operations for which it was organ. d,,
1ze
.
The regulations do not specifically cover the case of a corporation
which was dormant at the beginning of the base period and later revived
and commenced operations. It seems likely, however, that a corporation
which W?S merely a shell, an organization without function, on January
I, 1946 would be remitted to section 445 for relief as a new corporation, even though it had done business at some earlier time.117

VI. Physical and Economic Abnormalities During the Base Period
A. Qualification under Section 442. Section 442 is concerned with
correcting the effects upon the excess profits tax credit of particular
physical and economic adversities suffered by taxpayers during the
base period. Corporations which commenced business on or before the
first day of their base period are eligible for section 442 relief if during
one or more base period years: (I) normal production, output, or operation was interrupted or diminished because of the occurrence, either
immediately prior to, or during such taxable year, of events unusual
and peculiar in the experience of such taxpayer,58 or (2) the business of
the taxpayer was depressed because of temporary economic circumstances unusual in the case of such taxpayer. 159
The qualifying abnormalities are taken from section 722 of the
World War II law. 60 There is a further important qualification stated
in the relief formula itself; in order to be eligible for relief under section 442, the substituted excess profits net income ascertained by the
application of the appropriate industry rate of return to the corporation's
assets must be 110 per cent or more of the actual excess profits net income for the period affected by the abnormality. 61
Section 442(a)(l) is primarily concerned with physical events:
Hoods, fires, storms and similar manifestations. The requirement that
they must have occurred "immediately prior to" the affected year has
been construed under section 722 to imply a direct causal connection
rather than strict proximity in time and there appears to be no reason
57 Cf. Eveready Loan Corp.,
l!S I.R.C., §442(a)(l).
159 I.R.C., §442(a)(2).

2 T.C. 1035 (1943).

so I.R.C., §§722(b)(l) and 722(b)(2).
61 I.R.C., §442(c)(3) and §442(d). This limitation is primarily to avoid small claims.
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for a contrary interpretation in the present law. 62 Similarly, "production, output or operation" should retain its former meaning which covered services as well as the supply of tangible goods. 63 It may be noted
that in determining whether an event was "unusual and peculiar," the
standard is the taxpayer's own experience, so that if the event occurs
regularly each year in the taxpayer's business it cannot qualify. For
example, recurrent strikes or Hoods are characteristic of some businesses
although the same happenings tend to be unusual in others. 64
The reference in section 442(a)(l) to "normal" production, output
or operation may, however, be expected to cause a certain amount of
difficulty in its present context. In qualifying for relief under section
722, a corporation had to demonstrate that its base period experience,
because of one or more recognized abnormalities, was "an inadequate
standard of normal earnings." The relief credit was, as noted above,
a reconstruction of normal earnings for the period. The underlying
assumption was the existence of a discoverable norm for the particular
taxpayer and the fundamental problem of section 722 claims was the
determination of the norm. The use of the word "normal" in the
context of section 722 was, in a sense, a duplication. The old regulaticms in defining the word stated: "Normal production output or operation means the level . . . which would have been reached by the business of the taxpayer had the unusual and peculiar events not occurred."65 With the use of industry rates of return in the present law,
no effort is to be made to ascertain the normal earnings of the particular
taxpayer for the measurement of relief: the reference in every case is
to a mandatory general standard. However, the new regulations state:
"Normal production, output, or operation means the level . . .
customary for the taxpayer, determined on the basis of the actual
experience of the taxpayer up to the time the unusual and peculiar
event occurred." 66
Taken literally the quoted rule would require an applicant under section 442(a)(l) to show what its level of operation would have been
but for the abnormality, and, in addition, to show that level to be
normal. The difficulties arising out of this interpretation are obvious.
It may inject into the new law the necessity for a hypothetical reconstruction of normal income which was supposed to have been elim62 See U.S. Treas. Reg. 112, §35.722-3(a).
63 See U.S.Treas. Reg. 130, §40.442-2(a)(l).
64 Id. at subsection (3).

65 U.S. Treas. Reg. 112, §35.722-3(a).
66 U.S. Treas. Reg. 130, §40.442-2(a)(l).
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inated by the use of industry rates of return. It suggests that a taxpayer
hit by a strike during an unusually prosperous base period year would
be disqualified from section 442 relief if the affected level of operation
was not normal, even though the level caused by the abnormality afforded income substantially below the industry average. In the case of a
taxpayer operating at a low level during the base period, relief might
be denied even though the industry rate of return would carry such
taxpayer significantly above the income level it would have reached
but for the abnormality. In any event, the regulation represents a
substantial limitation of the automatic operation of this relief provision.
The amendment of the former rule, despite the identical language of
the two statutes, suggests that the Commissioner proposes to press the
implied limitation for what it is worth. It may very well be that the
reintroduction of economic analysis and judgment factors through the
regulations may operate to correct some of the absurdities caused by
the use of industry rates of return; it nevertheless appears to be unwarranted both as a matter of statutory construction and for its effect of offsetting the speed and certainty of section 442 determinations which
the newly chosen pattern of relief was intended to achieve.
A similar limitation of the automatic operation of section 442 is
apparently intended by the provision of the regulations which state that:
"Not every interruption or diminution of normal production,
output, or operation in the base period may furnish the basis for
the application of section 442(a)(l). The interruption or diminution must be significant and not trivial."67
This rule has been taken over from the regulations under section 722. 68
It is apparent that without such a requirement a producer which normally operates at a level of efficiency far below its industry average
might be given very substantial relief under section 442 on account of
very minor abnormalities. It may be noted, however, that the quoted
regulation is but a small ray of light in a fairly dark jungle, because it
does not cure the disparities between injury and relief which inhere to
the industry rate of return method as applied to cases of substantial
abnormalities. And it is unfortunate that no way was found to state the
requirement under the new law in more precise terms. While it is undoubtedly a desirable rule, its form in the regulations constitutes an
invitation to controversy and litigation.
Section 442(a)(2) is primarily intended to cover abnormal business conditions as opposed to the physical effects of nature and chance
67 Jd. at subsection (a)(2).
68 U.S. Treas. Reg. 112, §35.722-3(a).
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upon the taxpayer's operations. It corresponds in part to section
722(b)(2) of the prior law, which, however, gave as an additional
qualifying cause of depression, the taxpayer's membership in an industry depressed by "temporary" causes. To a limited extent this relief is
provided by section 446 for depressed industry subgroups. The unusual
nature of the base period from an economic point of view should produce a substantial volume of claims in the area covered by section
442(a)(2). Such things as reconversion, international disputes, inflation, material shortages and government controls all can be expected to
come into play. It may be noted that under the former law, it was the
government's view that depressing effects of management decisions
were not covered, and it is to be expected that the same position will
be taken in connection with section 442(a)(2). 69
The condition of section 442(a)(2) that the depressing economic
·
be of a " temporary" nature deserves some spec1a
·1 attencircumstance
tion. It operates to exclude from relief under this section corporations
whose adversities were the result of long-term factors which operated
to depress the business. As an example of a qualified event, the regulations cite the situation of a corporation whose total output had been
sold to a single purchaser which during the base period switched over
to another source, leaving its supplier with the necessity of finding new
markets. 70 An instance of an economic circumstance having permanent
effect might be the appearance of a cheap synthetic substitute for the
taxpayer's product. Many cases will, however, not be clearcut. But
the area of controversy may be limited by the availability of section 722
experience for the interpretation of the language of section 422(a)
(2),71 and by the fact that determinations of whether base period economic conditions reflected long-term trends will necessarily be made
with the advantage of at least some hindsight.
The gross receipts test for industry classification72 raises one of its
most vexing problems in connection with section 442(a): the extent
to which purely fortuitous circumstances predominate in measuring the
69 See BULLETIN, Part III(A): "A taxpayer cannot qualify for relief •.. because
its earnings were temporarily reduced in the base period in consequence of its own business
policies...." El Campo Rice Milling Co., 13 T.C. 775 (1949); cf. Dyer Engineers, Inc.,
10 T.C. 1265 (1948).
70 U.S. Treas. Reg. 130, §40.442-2(b)(2).
71 See Acme Breweries, 14 T.C. 1034 (1950) (national prohibition not a temporary
economic event); Trunz, 15 T.C. 99 (1950); Dyer Engineers, Inc., IO T.C. 1265 (1948);
Lamar Creamery, 8 T.C. 928 (1947); Harlan Bourbon & Wine Co., 14 T.C. 97 (1950);
Winter Paper Stock Co., 14 T.C. 1312 (1950); E.P.C. 12, 1947-1 Cum. Bul., p. 80.
72 I.R.C., §442(g).
·
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relief granted. For example, consider the situation of a corporation
which produces two products, each of which, if produced alone, would
result in a different industry classification. A Hood halts the output of
product A, but since the largest amount of the corporation's gross
receipts are attributable to product B, relief is based upon the experience
of corporations which produced B in the base period. The possibility
that reconstruction based on sections 442 and 447 will remedy the
injury caused to the corporation's income by the Hood becomes purely
a matter of chance, even apart from the validity of the average as a measure of normalcy; and if, in the above example, the sale of the A product
resulted in a high margin of profit as compared to the B product which
determined the industry classification, the distance between remedy and
injury is increased even more. If the high profit margin applied to the
product giving the larger share of gross receipts which was unaffected
by the abnormality, the taxpayer would get the benefit of the absurdity
of the statute, but the result would be no less wrong. And it should
be noted that in the case of corporations with multiple products the incidence of the chance result is increased by the gross receipts test itself,
because the abnormality will in every case where one part of the business is affected increase the preponderance of gross receipts of the unaffected part of the business and thereby tend to give relief on the basis
of an industry other than the one affected by the abnormality.

B. Substituting Average Base Period Net Income under Section
442. To begin with, if the qualifying abnormality affected the income
of only the taxpayer's poorest base period year, there would be no application of section 442 because that year would be automatically eliminated from the computation of average base period net income. 73 If the
abnormality affected any of the remaining 36 months after the elimination, reconstruction proceeds under one of two basic formulas, depending upon the period affected by the abnormality.
If no more than 12 of the remaining 36 months fall within taxable
years the income of which was depressed by the abnormality, reconstruction is governed by section 442(c). The taxpayer computes a substitute excess profits net income for each of the affected months by applying the industry yearly rate of return for the year74 in which each
such month falls to its total assets as of the last day of such year, reducing the amount so computed by the interest deduction for the year, and
73 I.R.C.,
74 I.R.C.,

§442(b).
§442(e)(2). Gross receipts for the year being reconstructed determines
industty classification. I.R.C., §442(g).
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dividing the result by l 2. 76 It should be noted that where the income
of a single month is depressed by an abnormality, the excess profits net
income of at least 12 months will be "affected" for the purposes of the
formula described above, because the computation of the excess profits
net income of any month is the average of the excess profits net incomes
of the 12 months of the year in which the month falls. 76 Therefore,
the income of at least one year will be reconstructed under section
442(c) in each case. The substituted excess profits net income for such
year is averaged with the actual earnings of the two remaining years
to give the average base period net income used in computing the
credit. 77 Taxpayers computing under section 442(c) may claim the
benefit of base period capital additions if the reconstructed year is
l 946 or l 94 7, and may claim l 949 base period capital additions where
the reconstructed year is 1948.78
If the abnormality affects more than one of the remaining three
base period years after the elimination of the poorest year, substitute
average base period net income is computed under section 442(d), in
which case the taxpayer's average total assets on the last days of the four
base period years are multiplied by the appropriate industry base period
rate of retum,79 the average annual base period interest deduction being
eliminated. Taxpayers using section 442(d) do not use base period
capital additions in the computation of the credit. 80
Substituted excess profits net income may be used under section
442(c) only if it exceeded l IO per cent of the amount of actual excess
profits net income for the year. Substituted average base period net income may be used under section 442(d) only if it exceeded l 10 per
cent of the actual average base period net income. 81
As noted above, even if a Hood interfered with only two months'
production, the abnormality, for purposes of the formula, affects the
full year and, in tum, the industry rate of return will apply to the full
year. This appears to be an undesirable loss of actual base period experience and adds to the artificiality introduced by the use of industry
rates of return. The loss is aggravated in the case of corporations which
75 I.R.C.,
76 I.R.C.,
77!.R.C.,
78 I.R.C.,

§442(e)(I).
§442(b)(I).
§442(c)(4) and (5).
§435(f)(3)(B) and (C).
79 Industry classification is determined according to the gross receipts of the last base
period year. I.R.C., §442(g).
80 I.R.C., §435(f)(3)(A).
81 I.R.C., §§442(c) and 442(d).
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compute average base period net income under the formula for abnormalities which affect more than 12 months. Such corporations use none
of their own actual earnings experience in the base period in computing
the credit, except as such earnings are incidentally reflected in retained
assets to which the industry rate applies. The artificiality is enormously
increased. For example, consider the case of an interruption of production which occurred in December and January falling within the
36 months remaining after the elimination of the poorest year. Because of the averaging noted above, 24 months are automatically affected. In such a case 34 months of physically unaffected base period
experience are discarded in computing average base period net income.
There may be very substantial problems in determining what
months are "affected" by abnormalities for the purposes of section 442.
A strike may last three, six or ten months, but even after the workers
have come back on the job, the corporation may not be able to attain
full production for several months thereafter. In the case of depressing
economic circumstances covered by section 442(a)(2), the difficulty
of determining when the corporation recovered is even more severe.
The factual problems will be complicated by the existence of economic
factors affecting business which have nothing to do with the qualifying
abnormality. For instance, consider the situation of the manufacturer
which sold its whole output to one customer which switched to foreign
sources of supply. Suppose that while the manufacturer is trying to
develop new outlets for its product, the market for that product becomes
generally depressed because of an industry recession. In such a case it
will be very difficult to fix the time when the depressing effect of the
loss of the customer is no longer felt. Neither the statute nor its legislative history are helpful on this point. A reasonable solution requires
an analysis of the taxpayer's base period experience of exactly the kind
made under section 722. It seems likely that in many cases the formulas
of section 442 will operate automatically only after base period income
has been "reconstructed" in quite the manner sought to be avoided
where the choice between substitution under sections 442(c) or 442(d)
is subject to dispute of the kind described. 82
Section 509 of the Revenue Act of 1951 provides a third alternative
method for computing relief under section 442. It adds a new subsection (h) to section 442, which permits certain taxpayers, after selecting the 36 base period months which result in the highest excess profits
net income or the smallest deficit in such income, to eliminate from the
82See note, 64 HARv. L. REv. 1143, 1148, n. 45 (1951).
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36-month period the 12 months having the lowest excess profits net
income or the greatest deficit, and to use a substituted excess profits net
income computed under section 442(e) for such 12 months. This alternative is available only if the aggregate of the excess profits net incomes for each of the 12 months for which a substituted excess profits
net income is to be computed is less than 35 per cent of one half the
aggregate of the excess profits net income for each of the 24 months
which remain after selecting the 12 months to be adjusted. Furthermore, the taxpayer's normal production, output or operation must have
been interrupted or diminished because of the occt;rrrence ( within 12
months preceding the beginning of the 12-month period to be adjusted)
of events which are unusual and peculiar in the experience of the taxpayer. As the Conference Committee Report points out, the diminution
of excess profits net income in the "third best year" subject to adjustment under section 442(h) need not have been caused by the interruption of production which is a qualification for the relief given. This may
ease the problem of qualifyip.g for section 442 relief in certain cases.
Corporations which qualify under section 442(h) may also qualify
under sections 442(c) or (d). Where there is overlapping, section
442(a) expressly provides for relief under the subsection which results
in the lower tax.

VIL New Products or Services Introduced During the Base Period
Corporations which commenced business before the beginning of
the base period and which substantially changed products or services
during the last three years of the base period are allowed to use a substitute average base period net income under the provisions of section 443.
In order to qualify for relief, the product change must have been substantial in two senses, one having to do with the difference in the
character of the taxpayer's business resulting from the change, and the
other concerned with the effect of the change upon the amount and
sources of the taxpayer's income.
The exclusion of changes which occurred in the first year of the
base period is technically convenient in that it permits the tests of substantiality to incorporate comparisons with at least one base period year
which was not affected by the change in the character of the business.
On the other hand, deserving taxpayers may be denied relief in cases
where the effect of a 1946 change was not realized soon enough in the
subsequent three years to make average base period earnings equal to
the equivalent of the taxpayer's industry's base period rate of return,
the benefit of which is available under-the formula of section 443 to
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corporations which made the qualified change in one or more of the
last three base period years.

A. Qualified Changes under Section 443. Under the pressure of
competition, the public taste for novelty, and the demands of advancing
technology, most American businesses are characterized by continuous
modifications and improvements in the kind and quality of their output. The clothing industry changes styles with the seasons; automobile
manufacturers introduce new models annually; everything from soap
to scooters is more commonly called "new" than "old.reliable." Section
443 is concerned, however, with a different kind of product change.
The requirement that the change must have been "substantial" means
in the first place that normal, routine development of old lines is excluded.83 Rather, as was the case under the provision of section 722,
from which section 443 is derived, 84 the change must amount in essence
to a real shift in the character of the taxpayer's business. For example:
a meat packer begins to manufacture drugs from waste products; a
pharmacy adds a lunch counter; a newspaper buys a radio station. As
usual, borderline cases will continue to be difficult. Consider, for instance, the situation of a railroad which introduced a Beet of trucks to
draw traffic from off-line territories or a soap maker which changed to
the production of synthetic. detergents. Fortunately, the experience
under section 722 will be available.85 The regulations are also helpful
in invoking "the trade custom or practice" in classifying the new products or services as being of a different class from those formerly
offered.86 If the common-sense position of the regulations is carried out
in practice, undesirable technicality can be avoided without sacrifice of
the real object of the requirement of substantial change.87
U.S. Treas. Reg. 130, §40.443-2(a)(I).
See BULI.EnN, Part V(I)(C)(2), concerning §722(b)(4). See also U.S. Treas.
Reg. 112, §35.722-3(d). See also Lamar Creamery, 8 T.C. 928 (1947); Stonhard Co., 13
T.C. 790 (1949); Suburban Transp. System, 14 T.C. 823 (1950). The present law does
not have the full reach of §722(b)(4), which gave relief to account for changes in the
character of the taxpayer's business, including in addition to change of output, (a) changes
in operation or management, (b) a difference in the ratio of nonborrowed capital to total
capital, and (c) the acquisition by the taxpayer of a competitor's assets with the consequence
that the competition of such competitor was eliminated or diminished. Furthermore,
§722(b)(4) provided for corporations which commenced business during the base period,
a situation now covered by §445. Furthermore, §722(b)(5) of the former law was a
"catch-all" provision which allowed reconstruction in the case of abnormalities not otherwise enumerated in §722, where the taxpayer could show that as a result of such "other
factor" affecting base period experience, such experience constituted an inadequate standard
by which to measure normal earnings.
85 See note 84 above.
86 U.S. Treas. Reg. 130, §40.443-2(a)(l).
87 See BULLETIN, Part V(I)(C)(2)(a), et seq.
83

84
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Under section 722(b)(4) a qualifying difference in products and
services furnished could be elimination of an old line as well as an addition of a new one. 88 However, it is clear under the present law that a
change in products or services for purposes of section 443 must have
been an addition to the corporation's output. Both the committee reports89 and the provisions of the statute refer to the "new" products and
services.90 It should also be noted that section 443 covers the addition
of several new products or services during the base period. 91

B. Effect of the New Line on Income. The qualifying change of
products or services under section 443 must also meet the following tests
of substantiality:
(1) By the end of the third year (or earlier) following the
year in which the change took place, the gross income from the
new line must aggregate to 40 per cent or more of the taxpayer's
gross income for such qualifying year or the net income which is
attributable to the new line must equal 33 per cent of the taxpayer's net income for the qualifying year; 92
(2) The corporation must also show that its average monthly
excess profits tax net income for the qualifying year (that is, the
first year in which it meets either the gross or net income test
described in 1), computed in the same way as base period excess
profits net income is computed, exceeds· by more than 25 per cent
the average monthly excess profits net income of those taxable
years which end within the base period and which precede the
year in which the change occurred. 93
Thus, the change in products or services may have occurred in any
one of the years 1947 through 1949. By the third year after the year
of change, the new product must meet the standards of importance in
the taxpayer's business described in ( 1) above and must have resulted
88 BuLLETIN, Part V(I)(C)(2).
89 Senate Report, Part III, §9(ii).
90 I.R.C., §443(a)(2).
91 Senate Report, Part III, §9(ii).

.
The report indicates that where the corporation
has made several substantial changes during the last three years of the base period, the
aggregate effect of such changes is to be considered in the determination of qualification.
92 I.R.C., §443(a)(2).
93 I.R.C., §443(a)(3). For the purposes of the 25% test, the excess profits net
income for the qualifying year is computed by making the adjustments provided for in
§443(b) I.R.C. for computing average base period net income. These adjustments eliminate
from the computation net operating loss deductions, gains or losses from capital transactions,
and certain other items which are primarily of a nonrecurrent nature; in making the comparison the average monthly excess profits net income for any period is not considered to
be less than zero. Sec. 443(e) also describes a special method for averaging where the
compared period includes two or more taxable years.
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in the income increase described in (2) above. Qualification can, of
course, occur in any of the three years subsequent to that in which the
change occurred, including years during the base period. Since only
the last three years of the base period can entertain qualified changes,
1946 is always available as the standard of comparison for the income
increase requirement stated in (2) ~bove. While changes occurring in
the first year of the base period cannot qualify under this section, there
is a certain amount of overlapping with the alternative provided for
growth corporations by section 435(e) and resort may be had to that
section for relief under circumstances which parallel the qualifications
for section 443 relief.
It should be noted that the "gross" and "net" incomes of the first
branch of the test requirement do not have special meanings for section 443, so that their definitions will conform to the familiar concepts
of sections 21 and 22 of Chapter I. However, these sections are not concerned with the allocation of items of net and gross income, which is,
of course, essential under sections 443(a)(l) and 443(a)(2). In connection with the sale of goods, there has been a rule of long standing
to the effect that the gross income therefrom consists of the gross sales
less the cost of goods sold.94 It is logical that the same rule should apply
for purposes of the gross income test of section 443(a)(2). Where
services are sold, however, gross income is essentially the equivalent of
gross receipts for other purposes of the code and undoubtedly the same
rule will be followed in the present context. Factually, the gross income test appears to present simpler problems than the net income formula of section 443(a)(2), which involves the allocation to the new
products of "overhead" deductions as well as those specifically related
to the goods or services sold. It has been suggested95 that the rule of allocation of portions of net income to sources within and without the
United States might be followed, which places against each class of
income those deductions which are directly connected with it, with a
ratable apportionment of the other deductions. 96 The suggestion seems
to be well taken. However, the net income test can be expected to
produce substantial problems in the close cases.
The presence in section 443 of the net and gross income tests
arouses some speculation as to why these more rational descriptions of
operating results were ignored in meeting the problem of industry
U.S. Treas. Reg. Ill, §29.22(a)(5).
See Alexander, "General Relief Provisions of the Excess Profits Act of 1950," 60
YALE L.J. 395 (1951).
96 U.S. Treas. Reg. 111, §29.119-10.
94
95
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classification in this and the other relief sections. It would seem to indicate that impracticality was not the reason, despite the admitted difficulty in applying the net income test in certain cases. The dichotomy
of approach in section 443 may very well provide the most obvious examples of the absurdity of the gross receipts test of industry classification, because corporations might establish that a preponderant portion
of net income was attributable to a new product in order to qualify,
while having to resort for the measure of relief to the indqstry index
determined by an old product which happened to produce more receipts but less profit.

C. Substitution of Average Base Period Net Income under Section 443. The relief formula which under section 443 provides for a
reconstruction of average base period net income where a qualified
change in products or services has occurred is fundamentally the same
as in section 442(d). A qualified corporation applies the base period
rate of return for its industry to total assets at the latest of the following
two dates: (I) the last day of the year immediately preceding its first
excess profits tax year, or (2) the last day of the year in which the corporation first qualifies for section 443 relief under the requirements
stated above. 97
.
The taxpayer's industry classification for the purposes of section
443 is determined according to the usual gross receipts test, based in
this case on the receipts for the taxable year in which falls the day used
to measure total assets. 98
Section 511 of the Revenue Act of 1951 amended section 443 to
provide for reconstruction of average base period net income in certain
circumstances which involve a commitment to change products or services made during the base period, where an actual change did not take
place until after the base period. Section 443(f) now provides that if,
after the taxpayer's base period, there was a substantial change in the
taxpayer's products, the change shall, for the purpose of section 443
(a)(l), be considered to have occurred on the last day of the base period
if the taxpayer prior to July l, 1950 commenced the construction of
facilities for the production of the new product and if such construction
and the production of the new product are in furtherance of a course of
o7 I.R.C., §443(b).

§443(c). In computing substituted average base period net income under
§443, the interest deduction for the year specified in §443(b) is eliminated. The excess
profits tax credit for a qualifying year which is an excess profits tax year does not include
any net capital addition or reduction determined under §435(g) for that year, but does for
capital changes in later years. I.R.C., §443(d). No allowance for base period capital
additions is made.
98 I.R.C.,
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action to which the taxpayer (or a corporation with which the taxpayer
has the power under section 141 of filing a consolidated return for its
first excess profits taxable year) was committed before the close of the
base period by contract with another person which contract granted a
license, franchise or similar right essential for the production of the
new product. It is quite obvious that the change made by section 511
will have but limited application. While there may be many cases
where taxpayers were committed to the production of new products in
one way or another before the base period, it can be expected that only
a few of these will also involve the granting of the required license or
franchise. It should also be noted that section 511 not only requires
the introduction of a new product, as did section 443 before the amendment, but it requires that such introduction be associated with an addition of productive facilities, i.e., capacity. A taxpayer can qualify under
the provisions of section 443 by introducing a new product during the
base period even though it used old facilities for the production thereof,
but that is not the case under the commitment rule.
VIII. Increase in Capacity
Section 444, like 443, grants relief in respect of a change in the
character of the taxpayer's business, in this case measured by an increase in capacity for production or operation during the base period.
The rationale of the relief is the recognized unfairness of treating as
mobilization profits and hence as "excess" for tax purposes, income
which in fact is attributable to an increase in the taxpayer's producing
assets. Section 444 is derived from section 722(b)(4) of the World
War II law which included an increase in capacity for production or
operation as a cause of base period income distortion which entitled
a taxpayer to relief.
In order to qualify under section 444, the taxpayer must demonstrate that it commenced business on or before the first day of its base
period,99 and that there w~ an increase in its capacity for production or
operation during the last 36 months of its base period.100 As in section
443 cases, the first base period year is always available for purposes of
comparison.
A qualified increase is deemed to have occurred if the corporation
(a) added to or replaced "facilities," meaning real property and de-·
preciable tangible property held in good faith for the purposes of the
99 I.R.C.,

100 Ibid.

§444(a).
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business,1°1 and (b) if such additions or replacements had one of the
following three consequences:
(I) capacity on the last day of the base period was 200 per
cent or more of capacity on the day before the beginning of the 36
month period mentioned above;102 or
(2) capacity on the last day of the base period was 150 per
cent or more of capacity on the day before the beginning of the 36
month period, and the adjusted basis for determining gain of the
taxpayer's facilities on the latter day was 150 per cent or more of
such basis on the former day;103 or
(3) the unadjusted basis of the taxpayer's facilities on the
last day of the base period was 200 per cent or more of such basis
on the day before the beginning of the 36-month period.104
Many service industries are excluded from the benefits of section
444 because increases in capacity resulting from the addition of intangibles are not covered. Such cases might involve department stores, advertising agencies, or other corporations for which the ability to do more
business depends upon an increase in personnel .rather than upon the
addition of "real property" or "depreciable tangible property," as the
statute requires. Similarly, an increase in capacity to do business due
to an investment in an advertising campaign would not be covered.
The same principle bars section 444 relief in two related categories of
capacity increase. Where the physical additions consist of leased property, there would be no basis for this relief, since the holding of property
required by the definition of qualified facilities in section 444(d) has
been construed to mean ownership rather than possession for use, in
connection, for instance, with the availability of the depreciation deductions.105
The reactivation of property which was idle prior to the last three
years of the base period is also not covered, because the increase in capacity resulting from placing such property in service is necessarily the
product of intangibles.106 A different view has been stated largely on
the strength of certain statements in the committee reports which suggest that the rationale of section 444 is the desirability of permitting the
excess profits credit to reflect increases in operations in the base period.107
101 I.R.C.,

§§444(b) and 444(d).
§444(b)(l).
10s I.R.C., §444(h)(2).
104 I.R.C., §444(b)(3).
105 See Dougherty Co. v. Commissioner, ( 4th Cir. 1946) 159 F. (2d) 269.
10s Ibid.
107 See note, 64 HARv. L. REv. 1143, 1151 (1951).
102 I.R.C.,
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If that were the intention, it is not realized in the statute. For
example, the alternative tests for qualification based on increased capacity for production or operation and increased basis, are both stated
as measures of the same thing, addition to facilities.· Since the reactivation of idle equipment could not result in any increased tax basis in
property, it would seem that reactivation could not be meant by the
term "additions to ... facilities," even though increased capacity for
purposes of the first and second alternative tests is in a sense brought
about thereby. Furthermore, idle equipment possesses that potential
for operation which the word "capacity" implies.
There is some danger, however, that the admitted exclusion of intangibles might be held to bar relief where the increase in capacity
resulted from a combination of factors. For instance, the situation of a
manufacturer which leased additional factory space, hired more labor,
and purchased additional machinery. In such a case the additional investment in equipment might not meet the second and third tests which
depend on relative tax bases, but qualification under the first test based
on capacity should not be denied because the increase is not wholly the
"result of" physical additions of facilities as defined in section 444(d).
A common-sense approach will clearly be necessary in cases of that kind.
Frequently the addition of some intangibles will be present, even where
the capacity increase is mostly attributable to physical additions and the
statute quite properly does not require that the tests measuring capacity
increase shall be met exclusively as the result of physical additions.
It is interesting to note that under section 722 any change in the
taxpayer's capacity for production or operation which occurred after
the close of the base period was deemed to have occurred on the last
day of the base period for the purpose of reconstructing average base
period net income if the taxpayer was committed, prior to the end of the
base period, to a course of action which resulted in the qualifying increase.108 For example, if the corporation contracted to purchase new
machinery and made a down payment in 1939, even though delivery
and full payment were not m~de until 1940, the change in the character of the business was deemed to have happened on December 31,
1939. Moreover, under the so-called "two year push-back rule," reconstruction of base period earnings for such a corporation proceeded
as if the added capacity became available on December 31, 1937.109
This latter benefit is not pertinent to section 444, because substitution
l0BJ.R.C., §722(b)(4).

109 Ibid.
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of average base period net income under the new law does not take into
account the effect on earnings of added capacity but depends only upon
the investment in the new facilities.
In view of the substantial business expansions which took place in
1949-1950, the omission of a commitment provision in the 1950 law
was regretted by many taxpayers. What may appear to be a substitute
for the rule under section 722 is contained in section 520 of the Revenue Act of 1951, amending section 444(£). However, closer examination indicates that section 520 is too narrow in scope to be considered
the eqpivalent of the earlier provision. Under section 444(f) as
amended, if a corporation, during the base period, was committed to and
began the construction of additional facilities, and completed the facilities during its first taxable year ending after June 30, 1950, the additional facilities, for the purpose of determining whether there was an
increase in capacity under the provisions of section 444(b), are considered to have been added to its total facilities on the last day of its base
period. Section 444(f)(2)(A) imposes an additional condition for qualification in that the taxpayer must, during the base period, have completed construction of a part of the new facilities representing more
than 40 per cent of the total cost thereof. Obviously the benefits of section 442(£) are severely limited by the language which defines qualified
"commitment" facilities: section 444(£) (2) in terms covers only "a
factory building or other manufacturing establishment" and "machinery or equipment" for use therein. This language implies that section
442(f) additions must include a new building or other structure, a requirement not found elsewhere in section 444. There appears to be no
sound reason why a corporation which enlarged its capacity by the
construction or acquisition of new equipment or machinery, intended
to operate in an existing structure, should be denied this relief. It is
possible, however, that the term "other manufacturing establishment"
will be construed to refer to a productive unit exclusive of a building,
although this interpretation requires some stretching of the statutory
language. It may also be noted tpat the purchase of an existing building to house new productive facilities may not be covered by section
442(£), the language of which implies a requirement of actual construction.
The commitment required under section 444(f) is not narrowly defined as it is under section 443. For qualification under section 444(f),
there must only have been a plan to which the taxpayer was committed
prior to the end of its base period. The statute does not specify what
constitutes a qualifying plan. It may .be presumed, however, that the
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Government will take a position on section 444(£) similar to that expressed in the Bulletin on section 722 with respect to section 722(b)
( 4). The Bulletin said that a legally binding form of commitment was
not required, but that there must have been some change of position
unequivocally establishing the corporation's intention to increase capacity and commitment to a course of action leading to the addition. Despite the inherent ambiguities of the language of section 442(f), it need
not be unworkable and it may permit a latitude of interpretation to take
into account the many variations of commitments which have business
substance.
The qualifying tests of section 444 are based upon potential for
operation and not actual operation. As a result, it is clear that the actual
physical addition or replacement of facilities must have taken place or
have been completed during the last three years of the base period.
Where facilities were constructed during the first year, even though the
full level of operation of which they were capable was not attained until
some time during the last three years, none of the three alternative
tests of qualification could be met, since the addition of "capacity" and
''basis" would have occurred prior to the end of the first base period
year. However, where the facilities were not completed before the end
of the first year, the first test, based exclusively on the capacity comparison might be met, even though the corporation could not meet the
second and third tests because it would have had a tax basis in the
uncompleted property at the close of the first year.
In many cases, the question of whether an increase in capacity has
taken place, and the measure of it, will be fairly simple; for instance,
where a fruit packer adds equipment to double the number of cases
handled per day, or a grain terminal operation is enlarged by the construction of additional storage space and handling facilities. However,
just as the industry rate of return technique is complicated by the fact
that many corporations produce more than one product, meeting the
capacity tests of section 444 may be difficult where the increase in
capacity is combined with a change in product, or the addition of a new
one. How does one ascertain the relative capacities of facilities for the
production of radios and those for the manufacture of television sets?
Or the equipment to make wooden window screens as against that
needed to make aluminum ones? Developments of this kind are fairly
common and will present a real problem in the application of section
444. For many business purposes useful comparisons of capacity can
be made using dollar figures such as cost of the product or sales values.
But the use of such measures under section 444 would inevitably have
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to be limited by their components which do not reflect capacity, e.g.,
relative price levels, relative profit margins, extent of utilization of
capacity, etc. In the cases where such "apples and oranges" are to be
compared, the concept of capacity tends to be quite elusive, and meeting the first and second tests of qualification under section 444 may
call for a considerable exercise of ingenuity. Admittedly, these problems involve the measurement of capacity rather than the establishment that facilities have been added and that an increase has occurred.
However, since the burden of proof is on the taxpayer, inability to arrive at a reasonable denominator of increase may be the equivalent of
being unable to show an increase at all.110
It should be noted that the second alternative test which combines
increase in capacity with increase in investment for qualification depends ·upon the adjusted tax basis for gain,111 while the third test which
is met solely by investment depends upon the unadjusted ba~is.112 The
principal difference in the two statutory bases is that the former reflects depreciation allowed or allowable with respect to the property involved. The investment factor of the second test will in many cases
require substantially less investment in the new facilities because the
. 150 per cent comparison will be made between the cost of the new facilities, reduced at most by three years of depreciation with the cost of the
old facilities reduced by an amount of depreciation which increases with
the age of the facilities. Under the third test, reference will be had
to the original cost of the old and new facilities in most cases, so that
taxpayers whose property was old at the beginning of the 36-month
period must have made a considerably larger expenditure to meet the
third alternative test than to meet the second.
·
The use of comparative investment alone as a measure of increased
capacity in the third test could in some cases lead to qualification under
section 444 where there was no real increase in capacity. The
cost of rep,roduction of ten year old facilities during tµ.e base period
might easily have been double the original cost. Expenditures made
primarily to promote economy or efficiency rather than capacity thus
might qualify for section 444 relief because of the lack of correlation between the cost of facilities and their potential output.
Reconstruction of average base period net income under section
444 closely follows sections 442 and 443. Industry classification is based
110 This problem was present under §722(b)(4). See BuLLBTIN, Part V(I)(C)(3),
where the definition and measurement of capacity increase is discussed.
111 I.R.C., §444(b)(2)(B).
112!.R.C., §444(b)(3). See I.R:C., §ll3(b).
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upon gross receipts for the last year of the base period.113 The base
period industry rate of return is applied to total assets as of the last
day of such last base period year. 114

IX. New Corporations
Corporations which began business after the beginning of the base
period may resort for relief to the provisions of section 445 for "New
Corporations." The growth formula of section 435(e) is available only
to corporations which commenced business before the close of the base
period and the general relief provisions already discussed apply only to
corporations which were in business before the start of the base period.
New corporations compute their alternative average base period net
income under section 445 solely by reference to the industry rate of
return. The basic income credit computed under section 435 is also
available to them, and in some cases its use could be advantageous.
Two alternative formulas for the computation of average base period
net income are used under section 445, depending upon which year's
excess profits tax liability is to be determined.
A. First, Second or Third Taxable Year, if Subject to Excess Profits
Tax. In computing the excess profits credit for any of the taxpayer's
first three years which is also an excess profits tax year, the corporation's
total assets for such year are multiplied by the appropriate industry
base period rate of return, and the product is reduced by the interest
deduction for such year, giving the average base period net income to
be used. For the purpose of section 445(b)(l), "total assets" consist
of the following:
(I) the corporation's total assets [as defined in section 442(£)]
on the last day of the taxable year first preceding the corporation's
first taxable excess profits taxable year, plus
(2) the net capital addition or reduction for the year whose
excess profits tax liability is being determined.115

In the case of a corporation beginning in an excess profits tax year,
the first branch of the formula will always give a zero result, so the
average base period net income for that year will be the first year's
113 I.R.C.,
114 I.R.C.,

§444(e).
§444(c)(l). The interest deduction for the last base period year is eliminated [§444(c)C2)]; no adjustment is made for base period capital additions.
115 I.R.C., §445(c)(l). See also §512 of the Revenue Act of 1951, which amended
§445(c) to provide for the inclusion of 100% of the increase or decrease in borrowed capital in the "total asset" base used under §445(c), instead of 75% as was the case under the
1950 law.
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capital investment multiplied by the industry rate of return. For the
second and third years of such a corporation, assets holdings as of the
end of the previous year would come into the base through the provision for the inclusion of capital additions. Profits for the current year
do not figure in the base to which the industry rate of return is applied.
Profits for the one or two preceding years do enter the computation to
the extent that they were retained for the purposes of the business.
B. Excess Profits Tax Years Other Than Taxpayers' First, Second
or Third Taxable Year. For other taxable years, the alternative average
base period net income is computed by applying the industry base
period rate of return to total assets [computed as under section 442(£)]
on the later of the following two dates:
( 1) the last day of the taxable year immediately preceding
the corporation's first excess profits tax year; or
(2) the last day of the corporation's third taxable year;
and reducing the product by the interest deduction for the year which
ended on the later of the two dates specified above.116
In determining the industry classification of a new corporation the
gross receipts test may be expected to result generally in fewer difficulties than will occur in connection with the other relief provisions,
because of the likelihood that such corporations will have concentrated
on products or services attributable to a single industry.
In the new corporation's early years, section 445 is likely to provide quite favorable treatment, because in such years new businesses
may frequently earn somewhat less than the industry average.
In order to deny section 445 relief where intercorporate transfers
of assets have taken place to get the benefit of new corporation treatment, section 445(g) enumerates certain transactions, participation in
which makes the new corporation ineligible for the benefits of the
industry average rate of return. The transactions are acquisitions of
property from other corporations which take place on or after December 1, 1950, and before the end of the new corporation's first three
years, where the basis of the property was carried over from the old
116 I.R.C., §445(b)(2). Net capital additions or reductions for the taxable year are
not rellected in total assets in determining the substitute average base period net income
under §445(b)(2). Subsequent additions or reductions are rellected in the usual manner
as a part of the credit based on income, but only from the date used to measure total assets
in the formula of §445(b)(2). The taxpayer's industry classification is determined for
purposes of §445(b)(l) by reference to the taxable year for which the excess profits credit
is determined thereunder, and for purposes of §445(b)(2) by reference to the taxpayer's
third taxable year, and in either case it is the industry classification under §447 to which
is attributable the largest amount of the taxpayer's ·gross receipts for such taxable year.
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corporation into the new,117 or where 50 per cent or more of the stock
of the corporations involved is owned directly or indirectly by the same
interests.118 These provisions prevent, for instance, the formation, by
a corporation which commenced business prior to the beginning of the
base period, of a new subsidiary to carry on a part or all of the old
business with the benefits of section 445 relief to which the parent was
not entitled. They also make it unprofitable for the owners of a going
concern to form or find a new corporation to carry on the old business
substantially as before with the benefit of a higher excess profits tax
credit derived from section 445. Some transactions technically covered
by section 445(g) are, however, excluded from its prohibition as provided
in section 462(g). For instance, if the corporations involved in certain
transfers interdicted by section 445 were both new corporations, section 462(g) allows section 445 relief under a formula which allocates
the several factors upon which the reconstruction of average base
period net income depends in order to equate the tax situation of the
combination with that which several components would have enjoyed.

X. Depressed Industries
Where a corporation was a member of an industry which was
generally depressed during the base period, it may use a substituted
average base period net income under section 446 in computing its
credit. 119 The technique of relief for such corporations is to utilize a
period which includes the war years as a standard of comparison to
determine the existence of industry-wide depression, and to base relief
on industry performance during the extended period. Section 446 was
particularly designed to improve the credit of corporations in such
industries as aircraft and machine tools which suffered during the postwar period a sharp decline in prosperity as compared with previous
years because of the absence of military requirements and the presence
of substantial war surpluses in the market. Obviously, for such corporations, reconstruction determined by the base period performance of
their industries would have afforded no relief.
111 I.R.C.,
118 I.R.C.,

§445(g)C2)(A).
§§445(g)C2)(B) and (C). See also I.R.C., §§462(g) and 46I(d) of
Part II which deny new corporation relief under §445 to corporate successors of partnerships
or sole proprietorships which were doing business before the beginning of the base period.
It is interesting to note that this rule does not apply to the ceiling tax on new corporations
referred to in note 27 above.
119 The earlier law contained §722(b)(3)CA), which allowed reconstruction of base
period earnings where the taxpayer showed that it had suffered from a depression which
was characteristic of the industry to which it belonged.
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Industry classifications for the purposes of section 446 are based
not upon the 64 groups which govern the application of sections 442445, but upon narrower and more numerous "subgroups" which compose the major groups. 120 A subgroup is deemed to have been depressed
in the base period where its averagelate of return on total assets during
the years 1946 -through 1948 is less than 63 per cent of the average rate
of return for the industry in the period 1938 through 1948.121 The
substitute average base period net income computed for members of
depressed industry subgroups under section 446 is computed by multiplying the taxpayer's average total assets122 for the base period by 80
·per cent of the subgroup's rate of return for the special I I-year base
period, 1938 through 1948.123
Classification in an industry subgroup is done under section 446
by a variation of the usual gross receipts test: the taxpayer must show
that 50 per cent or more of its gross receipts for taxable years beginning with or within the base period was attributable to the .depressed
industry.124 The variation may be quite disadvantageous to corporations which produced more than two products during the base period,
since if no product accounted for more than half the total receipts, no
relief whatsoever is available under section 446, whereas under the
other relief formulas classification in at least one group is always possible. The difficulty is increased by the relative narrowness of some of
the subgroups, since there is less possibility for variety within the subgroups and hence more likelihood that the corporations' second or third
products will fall outside the classification.
The use of the subgroups in section 446 raises a question about
why they were not used instead of the major groups in the other relief
sections. As noted above, classification in groups which were homogeneous internally would have resulted in more realistic rates of return
for reconstruction purposes.
120 See U.S. Treas. Reg. 130, §40.446-2(c). One of the "subgroups" for which
tentative adjusted rates of return have been proclaimed in the regulation-"Transportation
by Air," No. 8, is actually a "major group" and thus a composite of several subgroups.
121 I.R.C., §446(c).
122 Unlike the other relief provisions, §446 does not define "total assets" by reference
to the provisions of §442(f) hereinabove described. Presumably, this was an oversight,
since the pattern of §446 would seem to require "total assets" to mean what it does elsewhere in the relief provisions.
The fog which surrounds this point has been slightly thickened by the Revenue Act
of 1951. Section 446 was not amended to refer to §442(f). But §510 of the 1951 law,
which amends I.R.C., §442(f) (as to which see note 115 above), reads as follows: "Definition of Total Assets for Purposes of Sections 442-446."
128 I.R.C., §446(b). The average annual interest deduction is eliminated.
124 I.R.C., §446(g).
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XI. Growth Corporations
One further category of corporations for which the 1946-1949
period cannot be considered normal are those whose operations in that
period were characterized by growth substantially greater than that
enjoyed by industry in general. A principal example is television,
which was just getting started in 1946. In computing average base
period net income for a television set manufacturer, an obviously low
result would be produced if equal weight were given to the results of
the early and late years of the base period. The section 435(e) alternative generally allows growth corporations to use the best part of their
base period experience in determining the credit. The reconstruction
of growth corporation income is considered so fundamental to the concept of normal base period income that the pertinent relief provisions
are in section 435 itself as an alternative method for computation of
the income credit, rather than with the relief provisions proper. It
differs from the other relief provisions in that the substitute credit is
based upon actual experience rather than the industry average.
A. Quali-fi,ed Growth under Section 435(e). In order to qualify
for relief under the growth formula a corporation which began business before the end of its base period is given the option of meeting
either one of two alternative sets of tests established by section 435(e).
The "A" Tests. The corporation seeking relief under the A tests
must meet one of two conditions established to measure qualifying
growth. 125 These are
(I) The corporation's total pay roll for the last half of its
base period was 130 per cent or more of its total pay roll for the
first half of the period, or
·
(2) The corporation's gross receipts for the last half of its
base period were 150 per cent or more of its gross receipts for the
first half of the base period.
The alternatives were necessary to account for cases where growth
depended upon mechanization or other t!apital investment rather than
upon increases in labor force. 126 The measuring percentages reflect
the congressional judgment that corporations meeting the standards
125 I.R.C.,
126 Senate

§435(e)(l)(A).
Report, Part III, §11. Before the enactment of the Revenue Act of 1951,
corporations which began business after the beginning of the base period were excluded
from the benefits of the growth formula. The inclusion of corporations which commenced
business before the end of the base period results in automatic eligibility for relief under
§435(e) for corporations which commenced business after two years of the base period had
elapsed. This comes about because the requirements of §435(e)(l)(A) (other than the
$20,000,000 asset limitation) depend upon a comparison of the corporations' total payroll
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grew to a substantially greater extent than did industry generally during the base period.
No corporation can meet the A tests if its assets at the beginning of
the base period exceeded $20,000,000.127 In computing assets for this
purpose, the property of certain affiliated corporations is included,
whether or not consolidated tax returns were made.128 The reasons for
discrimination against large corporations are somewhat obscure. The
committee reports state that the restriction is intended to exclude from
the benefits of the provision large corporations "whose earnings experience does not justify additional relief on account of growth" during
the base period,1 29 which implies that the attainment of a certain size
gives some information about earnings experience. It seems likely that
the exclusion of large corporations proceeds from an aversion to their
size for its own sake. Certainly, size at the beginning of the base period
has no logical connection with the normalcy of the corporation earnings
during the base period if growth in fact occurred. The criticism may
be academic because of the rarity of $20,000,000 corporations which
can meet the A tests. But the lack of general application will, of course,
not make the fault of logic any sweeter to the taxpayers for which the
size limitation may be critical.
The "B" Tests. The A tests depend on the taxpayer's overall
growth during the base period. The B alternative, however, provides
relief where growth of sufficient magnitude occurred as a consequence
of the introduction of a new product. The B set has two criteria for
qualification, the first having to do with the causes of the base period
growth, and the second establishing the requisite amount of growth
due to such causes.
The qualifying causes are those "attributable to a product, or class
of products (including any article in which such product or class of
products is the principal component and including any article which
is a component of such product or, class of products), of a kind not
or gross receipts in 1946 and 1947 with its total payroll or gross receipts in 1948 and 1949.
Corporations which began business in the second half of the base period can have had no
payrolls or gross receipts in the first half. However, in the case of a corporation which
commenced business during the first two years of its base period, ease of qualification will
depend to a great extent on how close to the beginning of 1948 it commenced business,
since the amount of gross receipts or payroll which must be compared with the second half
of the base period will tend to increase as the time of beginning business approaches the
opening of the base period.
121 I.R.C.,
128 I.R.C.,

§435(e)(l)(A)(i).
§435(e)(3). The test of affiliation for this purpose is whether or not the
several corporations are permitted to make consolidated returns under § 141.
129 Senate Report, Part III, §11 at p. 27.
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generally available to the public at any time prior to January 1,
1946."180
There are three branches of the quantitative part of the B tests: 131
(1) twice the corporation's net sales for the first six months of 1950
equals or exceeds 150 per cent of the average net sales for the years
1946 and 1947; (2) at least 40 per cent of the corporation's net sales
for 1950 must have been attributable to the new product; and (3) the
amount of net sales of such product for 1946 must not have exceeded
5 per cent of such amount for 1949.
We are told that "a product which is a modification of an old
product, such as an improvement or change in style, is not a product
of the type referred to."132 The concept of novelty for the purposes of
section 435(e) closely resembles the requirement of substantial change
of products or services under section 443, with the difference, however, that under section 435(e) the product must be new to the public
rather than to the producer. But the regulations under section 435(e),
by their failure to elaborate upon the meaning of "generally available
to the public," suggest perhaps, that the growth formula in this respect
will receive a fairly narrow and technical construction unlike the more
generous approach which is indicated by some of the language of the
regulations covering section 443.133
A point to be remembered in interpretation of words "not generally
available to the public," it would seem, is the underlying purpose of
section 435(e) itself, which recognizes that substantial growth distorted
the base period income of the growing corporation, making actual
income an inadequate standard for measuring abnormal, or excess,
income. The B tests contain a formula for determining how much
growth qualifies, as well as stating what kind of growth qualifies. In
view of the existence, therefore, of an exact standard of the amount of
covered growth, administrative policy and judicial interpretation of the
new product language should tend to be liberal rather than technical.
It is the amount of growth which makes the income experience an
unfair standard. Over-strict construction of the new product provision
will tend to exclude from relief corporations with actual abnormal base
period income due to growth, while narrow construction cannot result
in relief for corporations with normal income experie:n,ce because the
quantitative provisions, by their very nature, can only be strictly con1so I.R.C., §435(e)(l)(B)(ii).
1s1 I.R.C., §435(e)(l)(B)(i), (ii) and (iii).
132 U.S. Treas.
133 Cf. note 86

Reg. 130, §40.435-3(e).
supra.
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strued. Against this principle, it can of course be argued that the B
tests represent an additional tax concession and that the A tests are
always available to growth corporations without reference to the causes
of growth. It is not suggested, however, that the "cause" language be
construed out of existence, but merely that growth and consequent
income distortion be recognized as the primary issue, and the causes
thereof as secondary in the context of relief against abnormal average
base period experience. The danger of over-technical construction of
the new product requirement in the growth formula is that criteria
resembling those of the patent law :field may become involved in tax
controversies where they do not properly belong.
The phenomenal postwar growth of the frozen citrus concentrate
industry might illustrate one of the possibilities. Frozen foods and
powdered concentrates were both generally available to the public
before 1946. The development of the frozen concentrates, especially
in the citrus :field, is undoubtedly a combination of old things in many
respects. It would be unfortunate, however, if the technical problems
of invention, novelty, combination, etc., were to predominate, or even
become particularly important, in deciding the question of public availability. Reliance should rather be placed on criteria akin to the general
understanding of the market. On the basis of the principle stated above,
the latter approach would give results in accord with the philosophy of
section 435 without denial of meritorious relief where growth actually
distorted income.
The meaning of the term "generally available to the public" is
ambiguous in another sense. Consider the case of a product which was
fully developed before 1946 but which was not widely marketed until
the base period, for lack of commercial interest or other business reasons. It could be argued that such a product was not covered by the
B tests, because the public _could have had it on demand. The argument appears to neglect the facts of commercial life. The requirement
of general availability should be interpreted to refer both to supply and
demand, again in conformance with general public understanding.
The criterion of availability should be market development. The question arises, however, as to how much market? There may be cases of
products available in a limited territory. Should growth based on introduction of the product to a new area be deemed covered? It might
well be argued that the "public" referred to in section 435 is the public,
or the portion of it, whose demand accounts for the qualifying growth.
A similar question may arise in connection with goods or services :first
widely adapted for general public use_ during the base period, such as
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home air-conditioning units. While these are perhaps a development
of a device formerly available, it may well be that the exploitation of
new markets, a new "public" in the commercial sense, should be considered covered growth within the meaning of section 435.
Apparently the provision of novel services is not covered by the B
tests. This may be an oversight, since growth based on the expansion
of the supply of services is of course covered by the A tests. In the
case of services the definition of novelty is perhaps more difficult than
in the case of tangible goods, but if a liberal interpretation of novelty
based upon markets is followed, the difficulty should not be so serious
as to interfere with administration, and logic seems to demand coverage
of new services. This is true because corporations providing services
rather than goods are particularly dependent upon the excess profits
credit based on income rather than that based on investment.
B. Reconstruction under Section 435(e). Corporations qualified
for relief as growth companies are entitled to compute their credit on
the best of three alternatives, and corporations qualifying under the B
tests may choose from a fourth. 134 The alternatives are as follows:
( 1) average base period net income based upon the last 12
months of the base period;
(2) average base period net income based upon the last 24
months of the base period;
(3) average base period net income based upon income of
the last six months of 1949 and 80 per cent of the income for the
first six months of 1950.
( 4) corporations which can qualify under the B tests, if their
excess profits net income for 1949 was not more than 25 per cent
of the amount of such income for 1948, have a fourth alternative
in that they may compute average base period net income upon
the last six months of 1948 and the first six months of 1950.
In the background of the general relief provisions, the relief for
growth corporations is somewhat startling for its logic. The income
which reflects the growth is considered normal, and that income is the
measure of relief. There is no wholesale discard of normal base period
experience for fictitious reconstructions which characterizes the other
relief provisions.

XII. General Relief: Procedure
The procedure for obtaining the benefits of the new general relief
provisions is generally simple and uniform with that provided for the
134

J.R.C., §435(e)(2).
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administration of the Internal Revenue Code generally.135 Applications
for relief are primarily to be m~de on the excess profits tax return;136
the forms now in use include sections for the computations necessary
under each of the relief provisions. Applications may also be made
within the period allowed for the £.ling of refund claims,137 and within
any further period allowed the Commissioner for the assessment of
deficiencies.138 In the latter case, the application of the relief provisions cannot reduce the tax by an amount greater than the amount of
any deficiency determined without regard to the relief provisions.139
No special rules are given on applications for section 435(e) (growing
corporations) relief, which is presumably to be treated simply as an
alternative to the income credit of general application.
Where a petition is £.led with the Tax Court concerning excess
profits liability for any year, applications under sections 442, 443, 444,
445 and 446 must be filed prior to the time of the filing of such
petition.140
Section 447 also provides that the relief sections shall not be applied
on any grounds other than those stated in applications filed seasonably
pursuant to section 447(e). The regulations state that, "the application, however filed, must include a statement setting forth in detail
each ground upon which the taxpayer relies, and facts sufficient to
apprise the Commissioner of the exact basis for the application."141
It does not seem that the requirement of the regulations burdens
taxpayers with the necessity for including excessive details in the statements which must accompany applications for relief. In this connection it may be noted that the bulletin on section 722 stated, "considerations of good administration require that the taxpayer should be
given a reasonable opportunity to perfect the claim. In such cases the
taxpayer should be advised of the defects or inadequacy and given a
reasonable tiµie to amend the claim or submit the information required."142 While the reasons for generosity in this regard are less
compelling under the new law, it seems clear that the opportunity for
135 The rules governing application for the benefits of §§442, 443, 444, 445 and 446
are stated in §447(e).
136 I.R.C., §447(e)(A).
137 I.R.C., §447(e)(B). In such case the application of the relief sections shall be
subject to the limitations on the amount of refunds provided in §322.
13s I.R.C., §447(e)(C).
139Ibid.
140 I.R.C.,

§447(e).
U.S. Treas. Reg. 130, §40.447-3(b).
142 BuLLETIN, Part IX 'IICB).
141
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factual clarification should be no more limited under the general relief
provisions than it customarily is in respect to ordinary claims for refund.

XIII. Conclusion
When the new general relief provisions are examined either in the
light of their underlying philosophy or with respect to the details of
their operation, objections appear which are too serious to be compensated for by considerations of expediency. The fundamental criticism
has to do with the discrimination against the efficient business through
the use of the industry rates of return. · The credit based on earnings
is given as an alternative in the code to eliminate the discrimination
against such efficient producers which would come about if all corporations were required to determine their "normal" earnings with reference to a fixed rate of return on invested capital. In fact, the stated
rate of return used with the investment credit was fixed high enough
to benefit "taxpayers who happened to have poor earnings experience
in the base period" ;143 in other words the minimum rate of return
allowed to be enjoyed free of excess profits tax under the invested capital alternative is itself a general average.144 The credit based on base
period income is designed to provide fair taxation for corporations which
normally earn more than that general average. It is intended to permit
such corporations to earn free of excess profits tax the income which
is normal for them. The rationale of the general relief provisions is
the necessity to preserve for the efficient business the credit based on
income which their normal experience justifies despite the existence
of circumstances adversely affecting base period experience which are
not the result of low efficiency. Reconstruction based on industry
average rates of return is inconsistent with that rationale. The efficient
corporation is denied the benefits to which it is entitled because of the
effect upon the industry average of inefficient producers. On the other
hand, the inefficient producer to whom relief is available is given a
reduction in tax because of the superior performances of its betters
which raise the industry rate of return upon which relief depends. It
is of course no answer to say that in the long run the results average
out to give fair relief. The relief provisions must be judged by their
service to the efficient producer, not to the average corporation. The
answer would be valid only if taxes were paid by industries instead of
143
144

Senate Report, Part III, §1 at p. 3.
Senate Report, Part Ill, §5.
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corporations. That not being the case, the technique of relief is acceptable only if it reflects the relative efficiency of the particular taxpayer,
and that is what the relief provisions based on industry rates of return
do not do. The objection might be cured somewhat by a narrowing of
the industry groups, because of the tendency of competitors in the same
line to have similar efficiencies; but the results will be wrong as long
as the groupings are made on the basis of "industries," however defined,
only some of the errors will be smaller.
Inevitably, the new relief provisions must be judged by comparison
with section 722 of the World War II law, which was basically sound
because it made the relief granted proportionate to the injury suffered.
Yet it was discarded because Congress believed that it had excited
widespread dissatisfaction; that the area of administrative discretion
was so great and the law so complex that there were extended delays
in settlement of cases; that too much subjective judgment was required;
that proving a claim was too expensive for the small taxpayer.145 These
objections go primarily to the administration, not the substance, of section 722. The complaint about slow-motion and an administrative logjam has perhaps been seriously overdone.146 And it does not seem
1415 Senate Report, Part III, §9.
146 The following information has

been received from the Excess Profits Tax Council
in a letter of June 12, 1951.
Under §722 there have been 56,000 claims (each relating to a single year) by approximately 20,000 corporations. Claims of fewer than 2,000 corporations are outstanding.
These are in four stages of consideration as follows:
1. Pending before the §722 Field Committees in the Offices of the Internal Revenue
Agents-in-Charge-Claims of approximately 175 corporations.
2. Pending before the Excess Profits Tax Council-Claims of approximately 625
corporations.
3. Pending before Units of the Bureau for computation of tax effect, consolidation
of standard issues, issuance of statutory notice, etc.-Claims of approximately 500 corporations.
4. Pending before the Tax Court of the United States-Claims of approximately
650 corporations.
Thus, fewer than 10% of corporations which filed claims are without final determinations. It may be noted, however, that the unresolved cases concern approximately $2,500,000,000 of tax reductions out of a total excess profits tax reduction claimed of approximately
$6,500,000,000 by the 20,000 corporations mentioned above. Of the 175 corporations
whose claims are still under consideration by the §722 Field Committees, fewer than 75
have yet to receive reports from revenue agents about their claims.
Since its organization, the Excess Profits Tax Council has acted with respect to the
claims of more than 9,000 corporations. This actual and potential load now consists of
the claims of about 800 corporations and the council has held hearings with respect to the
majority of these. The council has made or approved allowances for more than 4,000
corporations. Eighty-seven corporations filed claims for tax reductions of more than $10,000,000 for each corporation, and the council has acted on 29, or one third of the claims'
of such corporations. About 1,300 corporations filed a total of almost 1,600 petitions with
the Tax Court of the United States. About one half of these have been disposed of either
by stipulation or by trial. There have been trials of the cases of 90 corporations and the
cases of about 560 corporations have ended by stipulation. Recent experience of the
council indicates that the number of trials in the remaining cases will be between 20 to
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that section 722 was inherently incapable of fair and efficient administration. In 1944, the Bureau gave its officials a very reasonable statement on the application and administration of section 722:
"References were made in committee reports to the desirability
of 'sympathetic administration' in cases and problems arising under
section 722. Sympathetic administration means a fair, reasonable,
and intelligent administration, designed to afford to those taxpayers which establish their right to relief the full measure of
relief available under section 722. It requires that the action
taken with respect to applications for relief be grounded upon the
exercise of a sound and informed judgment and an understanding
not only of the taxpayer's business but also of the taxpayer's place
in its industry and business generally.
"The basic problem to be met under section 722 is the determination of whether an excess profits credit is inadequate, whether
the factors causing the inadequacy are the type in respect of which
the section is designed to afford relief, and what constitutes the
normal operations of the taxpayer upon which normal earnings
can be computed. That problem is new and difficult and imposes
upon examining officers broader procedures than the accustomed
one of verification of facts submitted and application of law. It
cannot properly be resolved unless and until a thorough study has
been made of the entire background of the case to develop the
conditions under which the taxpayer operates, as well as the relevant conditions of its industry and of business generally, so that
the 'whole story' may be obtained."147
The spirit of that directive was almost never followed. In the field,
section 722 cases were committed to the hands of revenue agents
whose ordinary professional outlook was dominated by the demands of
the revenue; whose ordinary professional technique was the audit, i.e.,
"verification of facts submitted and application of law." Both the outlook and technique were wholly unsuited to the solution of section
722 problems, which essentially called for reasonable, informed business judgments of what the taxpayer would have done but for the
25% of the number of corporations filing petitions or between 15 and 20% of the number
of petitions.
The Excess Profits Tax Council which only has authority to make determinations (the
final disposition of the claims resting with either the claimant or the Tax Court) in the
latter part of 1948 undertook to provide determinations with respect to most of the §722
claims within approximately three years. This program is virtually complete inasmuch as
fewer than 75 corporations have not received reports from revenue agents and the claims
of only 800 corporations have not been the subject of a determination by the Council.
147 BoLLEnN,

Part I, ,r(C).
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abnormality. It is the kind of judgment that businessmen are always
required to make in evaluating risks, competition, property, and economic uncertainty. Such judgments can never be made to the penny;
they can never be made with the absolute certainty that a particular
evaluation is the only one that reasonable men could reach; but businessmen are accustomed to act every day on the basis of such judgments.
Section 722 called for no more; but in its administration taxpayers were
too often faced with the necessity for making "penny" proofs or failing.
By the very nature of the problems posed, such proofs could not be
given. No wonder there was "widespread dissatisfaction" when the
administration of relief degenerated into a broil over questions that
could not be answered and should not have been asked. Reconstructions of base period net income under section 722 should have been
committed at the first level to boards recruited from outside the Bureau
of Internal Revenue, composed of men accustomed to the use of the
kind of economic and financial data which was relevant in section 722
cases, directed to find answers that were reasonable and sound from a
business point of view and no more. Without such bold administration,
section 722 was perhaps doomed to pass away unlamented, as it did.
It has received more praise since the present law was enacted than it
ever got while it was current. It is not to be doubted that the new law
will operate fast and without substantial controversy in many cases, but
if the result is wrong, what does it matter how quickly it is reached?

